Creative Destruction
in the Antebellum
Marketplace:

The failure of Page and Bacon illustrates the challenges
confronting St. Louis merchants in the 1850s. The end
of the Mexican War brought renewed migration and
prosperity, while the telegraph and railroads promised
to connect the distant markets faster than ever before.
However, technology also brought increased competition.
New men and money arrived from the East, and the city
of Chicago rose to challenge St. Louis for the commerce
of the Great West. Prosperity could still be interrupted by
bank failures , and events in distant cities effected everyone
in the marketplace faster than ever before. St. Louis
merchants and bankers used commercial organizations
to rationalize and lend stability to the marketplace, but
despite modernization and greater organization, merchants
were reminded that, like their hard-money opponents
in the legislature, they were also unable to control the
marketplace. 2
Following the Panic of 1819, two competing ideas
about how to maintain order in the marketplace emerged
and became more sharply divided during Missouri's

struggle to charter a state bank. Debates over relief laws,
banking, currency, and government intervention were the
beginning of a national debate in which different views of
the market economy emerged. Neither camp had a clear
vision of what lay ahead, but instead responded to events
and changes based upon their experience and an imperfect
knowledge of the events which they confronted.
Bank failures following the panics of 1819 and 1837
hardened anti-banking sentiment in Missouri, codified in
constitution and law, leaving merchants in St. Louis to rely
on private banking as they faced challenges to their trade
routes after the Erie Canal opened in 1825. A branch of
the Bank of the United States opened in 1829 but closed
in 1836. The creation of a state bank in 1837 provided
little in the way of needed credit or currency because
of restrictions set by the state legislature, which was
controlled by the hard-money faction of the Democratic
Party. Those who tried to restrict banking and paper money
were working to take control of the marketplace as a
means of restraint. Others, whom I am calling merchants,

A shortage of specie-gold and silver-and money shortages marked the Panic of 1837, as the signs on the banks in this
cartoon suggest. Differing views on the Panic are seen here-drunken "Locofoco" members, laborers out of work, wealthy
investors giving alms to a woman with a child. In St. Louis, larger specie deposits from the Santa Fe trade initially reduced
the impact of the Panic. (Image: Library of Congress)
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The aftermath of the White Cloud steamboat fire in May 1849 and its destruction of some nine city blocks and 400
buildings provided St. Louis an opportunity to create a new physical environment to reflect its changing business priorities
at mid-century. Among those was construction of the new Merchants Exchange on Third Street at Chestnut. Having such
an Exchange was part of a broader effort by St. Louis businessmen to transform St. Louis into a major metropolitan area .

(Image: Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper)
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had a better, though imperfect, understanding that the
market cou ld not be restrained and worked to continue its
operation, to maintain order within the marketplace. Each
side in this contest was working to impose its ill-defined
vision of order in the marketplace.
Merchants were pressed as hard by the market economy
as any small farmer or laborer might have been. Even
local business was competitive, but, it was hampered by
political opponents who worked to restrict banking and
by transportation developments which made it easier to
participate in the market economy, but also brought a new
inter-city competition with rival merchants in Chicago.
The organizations they created contributed to a more
orderly marketplace, but as they responded to the approach
of railroads from the east, merchants built a new order that
displaced the old.3
The return of prosperity in the late 1840s and rebuilding
after a massive fire in 1849 helped to consolidate existing
commercial organizations. The Chamber of Commerce,
the St. Louis Exchange, and the Miller's Exchange merged
into one, calling itself the St. Louis Merchants Exchange.
Unlike the city-owned marketplaces or small shops where
vendors sold their wares directly to consumers, the new

Exchange was instead a place for larger scale merchants
engaged in the wholesale business. 4
From the 1850s on, the Exchange took on a greater
utility, and city merchants showed a greater interest in
its operation. The permanent advent of the Merchants
Exchange, with its constitution adopted in January 1850,
was a structural separation in the local marketplace that
created a two-tiered organization where one level was
political and the other solely for conducting business.
Membership in the Exchange conveyed the privilege of
doing business on the trading floor, but governance and
leadership were restricted to members of the Chamber
of Commerce, who served on committees and voted for
officers and on the admission of new members. By 1860
there were over 600 members in the Exchange and 200
members in the Chamber who were able to participate in
its government. 5
The Constitution with Rules and By-Laws established an
arbitration process that was faster and more efficient than
the state court system, and fellow businessmen ruled on
the case rather than a randomly selected jury drawn from
the community at large. Merchants could still take their
chances in court; however, surviving records show that
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merchants used the Arbitration and Appeals committees
repeatedly to resolve disputes arising in business. 6
Merchants were unable to control entry to the
marketplace but instead used the organization to
collectively judge behavior and expel those whose
business practices were considered inappropriate. One
surviving account of the politics within the Chamber and
the Exchange indicates that it was a place of relative amity,
and the elections for committees and officers suggest
that control of the organization rotated every few years
among factions within the merchant community, which
assured that anyone could be assured of a fair hearing,
and that no one person or group could take control of the
organization .7
Information helped to rationalize the marketplace, which
was made easier to obtain by the telegraph, improved
transportation, and steam-driven press. By the mid 1850s
city merchants were apprised daily of local, national, and
international market conditions. National publications
kept merchants apprised of conditions in other cities, but
merchants also needed information on local and regional
developments. The Exchange collected information on
local developments such as the arrival of steamboats and
their cargoes. They also published a Price Current and
allowed representatives from city newspapers access, thus
ensuring wider publication on events in the market. 8
Although merchants created an alternate governing
structure for the marketplace, they did not see the market
economy as separate from society. What was good for
business, an 1852 annual report claimed, was good
for the city. Personal profit was their goal but also the
"growth , wealth, and permanent prosperity of our city."
Trade, commerce, and manufacturing were so "intricately
interwoven" into the life of the city, the writer claimed,
that it was impossible to separate them. 9
A third level appeared in the local marketplace in 1856
when a group of merchants and bankers chartered a private
corporation and erected a modem building which they
leased to the Exchange and Chamber of Commerce. All
of the stockholders and directors of the company were
at the top of the city 's business community and could be
cl assified as financiers and capitalists. Although they were
of different political beliefs, they set politics aside in order
to do business and were united in defense of their city
against northern and eastern rivals . These same men took
the lead in bringing railroads to St. Louis as they worked
to stay ahead of their rising northern rival, Chicago. 10
Organization helped to rationalize the marketplace and
to make the market economy function more smoothly,
but business still needed the credit and money issued by
banks over which the hard-money Democrats exercised
control, or thought they did. As state banking and
currency laws became more restrictive, merchant-bankers
in St. Louis adapted first by relying on local insurance
companies to issue paper money, until the legislature
threatened to revoke their charters. Private banks then
issued checks drawn on their specie reserves, known as
"promises to pay," and later invested in note-issuing banks
located in neighboring Illinois. As long as their notes
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remained convertible to specie, they were legal tender,
and Missouri 's legislature had no power to prohibit their
circulation. That fact left private bankers relatively free to
conduct business and kept the marketplace operating, but
this freedom to trade and issue currency brought its own
problems. 11
The capital business was ruthlessly competitive as local
bankers raided each other's specie reserves by collecting
outstanding banknotes and presenting them for payment.
The combination of domestic legislative hostility, out-ofstate banking, and fierce competition created a financial
system that was both inadequate and unstable. Although
the hard-money Democrats prided themselves on a state
bank that issued little paper money and maintained high
specie reserves, by the 1850s the economy was too far
advanced to depend on hard-money alone. Railroads
required greater pools of capital than steamboats or
canals ever had, and for St. Louis to protect its place in
the West it would have to become the railroad hub of the
Mississippi Valley. In order for that to happen the city
required more than an ad hoc financial system. 12
In June 1852, a group of private bankers formed the St.
Louis Board of Bankers and Exchange Dealers, which
attempted to bring order to the local financial market. The
Board was first suggested by Daniel D. Page who, with his
son-in-law Henry D. Bacon, opened a St. Louis bank in
1848, then in 1850 opened a branch in San Francisco. By
1852 Page, Bacon and Company was the "most powerful
and conspicuous" private bank in each of the two cities.
Although stopping specie raids was not listed in the
articles, it was likely that goal may have been the primary
reason for the group's creation . 13
The Board established interest and exchange rates and
rather than use the power of the state to prohibit unreliable
paper money, the bankers relied on the logic of the market
to determine safe currency. Available information made it
possible for local bankers to reject those notes which were
unreliable, and merchants, shopkeepers, and employers
would be forced to follow suit, eventually driving them
from circulation . In protecting themselves from the
worthless banknotes, the Board protected everyone
engaged in the marketplace, and all who were subject to
the market economy. 14
In a rapidly growing city, bankers and merchants both
fac ed a problem of reliability in selecting those with whom
they did business or extended credit. By 1850, over half of
St. Louis residents had been there less than two years, and
long-time merchants, according to one newspaper, were
"surrounded by thousands of strangers whose character
was unfamiliar." 15 Kinship and personal acquaintance
were not always the best means of judging sound decision
making or success in business. 16 William Tecumseh
Sherman was induced to leave the army and manage the
San Francisco branch for a St. Louis banking partnership
entirely on the word of a mutual acquaintance. Sherman
proved to be worth his salt, but when Daniel Page sent his
son to San Francisco to manage a branch bank there, the
young man proved to be weak and indecisive. Two local
partners conspired against the younger man, and Sherman

Streets in the business district of cities like St. Louis looked much like this, with a mix of wagons and horses, small wooden
business structures, and newer three-story buildings. (Image: State Historical Society)

described one as "too fond of lager beer to be trusted with
so large a business." 17
The Bankers Association established a rating system
to determine who among the merchant community was
worthy, but despite this and other advantages, the Board
of Bankers and Exchange Dealers was short lived, lasting
less than a year. In August 1852, only two months after
its inception, Henry Bacon withdrew his bank, citing
disagreements over commission rates on financial
instruments. The Board continued meeting sporadically
but finally disbanded in February 1853 and had been no
more successful at controlling banking than its hard-money
opponents in the state legislature. 18 The 11 members of
the Board controlled entry into the group; however, there
is no record that anyone applied for membership after its
founding, and there was no rule of exclusivity between
members . St. Louis bankers and exchange dealers were
trying to control the city's financial market at a time when
capital was becoming concentrated in New York and
beyond the control of a regional commercial city. 19
Henry Bacon and Daniel Page were, however,
not forthcoming about their reasons for leaving
the organization. The timing coincides with their
announcement of taking a contract to build a section of
the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad, extending from St.
Louis to Cincinnati . Bacon was also the leader in a group
of St. Louis investors building a short railroad connecting
the city to coal mines in Illinois some 20 miles away.
In September 1852, he took on the additional burden of
extending the railroad across the state to meet the O &
M, which would give St. Louis a rail connection to the
east coast via Cincinnati and challenge the links existing
to Chicago. In taking the contract, Bacon over-extended

his bank; minutes from the Bankers Association indicate
that he was beginning to experience financial problems
two and a half years before his bank finally went under.
The evidence indicates that Henry Bacon was doing all
he could to maintain high cash flows , which went into the
railroad.20
Bacon's problems were made worse by events in San
Francisco. He constantly pressed his branch there to
send gold to his bank in New York which allowed him to
maintain credit and "gave him a good name," but it was
a circular system of money transfer from the California
gold fields to New York, then to St. Louis. From there
Bacon paid the contractors on the railroad until they went
bankrupt, and he had to buy materials and pay the workers
directly to continue progress. A collapse in the San
Francisco speculative bubble caused by large-scale fraud
committed by a city businessman weakened his western
branch. By late 1854, Bacon 's desperate need for capital
was a barely kept secret, and when the collapse came in
January 1855, William Sherman claimed that they had
all finally reached " the Niagara [Falls]" that no one had
foreseen when he entered the banking business two years
prior. 21
The failure of Page and Bacon in 1855 showed that more
information, improved transportation, and organization
made the market operate more efficiently, but they also
bound everyone in the marketplace more tightly together.
Bacon's position as the leading banker in two cities made
many others dependent on him to continue their own
businesses. Mechanics and tradesmen lost whatever wages
they were owed. As Sherman observed in San Francisco,
"the most noisy and clamorous were men and women
who held small certificates [of deposit]" in his bank.
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St. Louis businessmen were no different than those in other cities with strong manufacturing and merchant economies in that
they actively promoted railroads to connect them to markets more efficiently. The Ohio and Mississippi Railroad spanned
eastward from St. Louis to reach the Ohio River faster and cheaper than steamboats. (Images: Library of Congress and
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Organizations helped to establish order for those who were
engaged in the marketplace, but they could not calm a
restless crowd of people who feared losing everything they
had because of events over which they had no control. 22
Routine, day-to-day transactions in the marketplace
were increasingly impersonal, and familiarity with others
in the marketplace was less common, but reputation was at
times still important. The public pledge of financial safety
worked once in St. Louis, but as Sherman observed, the
same thing failed in San Francisco. People who came to
his bank after the news of Page and Bacon's failure wanted
to touch their money to be sure it was safe. Perhaps
comparing the experiences of the two cities reflects on the
volatility of the marketplace. The gold rush environment
of San Francisco might have made any assurances
impossible, while St. Louis was more settled in terms of
its market relations; therefore, people were willing to be
reassured .23
Why did some business organizations succeed and
others fail when they had similar methods- membership
in the group, rate structures, and penalties for violations?
Surviving records of the Chamber of Commerce indicate
that members were willing to follow the findings of the
Arbitration and Appeals Committees, while the Bankers'
Association minutes show that from the beginning,
member bankers violated the rules setting exchange rates.
There was no incentive to go along with the organization's
rules when non-members could undercut their competitors.
It may come down to the size of the organization. By
1860 the Merchants Exchange had over 600 separate
businesses. The Bankers' Association never had more
than 11 , and it operated in a regional commercial center.
Such a small group could not successfully bring order to

its level of the marketplace when there were many more
in the banking business who were willing to undercut its
attempts at control.
The Merchants Exchange provided familiarity and
a means of ascertaining character in the impersonal
marketplace as it came to be the place to conduct business
for merchants operating on the middle level. It was an
imperfect system, but the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce
and Merchants Exchange helped to establish order in
the marketplace of one city. When connected to similar
organizations in other cities, they began to establish order
in the wider marketplace.
Success or failure also depended on the separation
into different levels in the marketplace. If a merchant in
the Exchange failed, the repercussions were relatively
mild. An individual merchant or partnership was part of
a network involving others, but if one failed, the entire
marketplace did not cease to function. However, the uppertier capital became concentrated in New York throughout
the l 850s, making it impossible for a local organization to
exercise control. As the local panics that beset St. Louis
and San Francisco in 1855 showed, both involving Page
and Bacon, bank failures had a far greater impact and the
public responded accordingly. Disruptions in the upper
level of the marketplace had ramifications in distant cities.
The emerging capitalists were at the top, but their product,
capital, was at the bottom, supporting everything else.
Merchants created organizations that made the marketplace
more orderly, but it could always be overturned. The logic
of the marketplace forced them to respond to competitors
in other cities, and in doing so, they created a new order in
the marketplace. 24
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